Archbishop Scicluna’s Sermon: The Rule of Law Applies to the Church Too
The Chief Justice and his wife attending the Independence Day Mass at St John’s Co-Cathedral, during which Archbishop Charles Scicluna delivered his sermon. Photo: Archdiocese of Malta.
In this short video, I raise a question about Archbishop Scicluna’s Independence Day sermon and the relationship between the Church, the judiciary and the rule of law.
Malta’s official Independence Day celebrations include High Mass at St John’s Co-Cathedral, attended by the President of the Republic, members of Parliament and representatives of the judiciary. The Chief Justice also attended, accompanied by his wife.
My purpose is not to assess the sermon’s broader political message. Some have praised it as a powerful condemnation of corruption; others have interpreted it as a political intervention. I leave that debate to others. My concern is more specific: the Archbishop’s reference to the Caruana Galizia family and Daphne’s murder, in the context of a jury’s recent acquittal of the accused on all counts.
The Archbishop did not explicitly connect his remarks to that verdict. Nevertheless, I understood his words as suggesting that the family had been denied justice, with the implication that the accused should not have been acquitted. It is this implication, and the setting in which the remarks were delivered, that concerns me.
The prosecution and the parte civile have indicated their intention to appeal. In my view, therefore, the matter remains sub judice. Is it prudent for an archbishop to make remarks that could be understood as questioning the acquittal during an official state ceremony, in the presence of senior public officials, including the Chief Justice?
As a lawyer, Archbishop Scicluna should understand how sensitive this situation is. Criminal appeals in Malta are heard by three judges, with the Chief Justice normally presiding. His potential role in the proceedings makes the circumstances particularly delicate.
The concern goes beyond the presumption of innocence: a jury has already acquitted the accused. It also concerns his right to fair and impartial proceedings should an appeal follow. Could remarks of this kind, delivered by the Archbishop, create the appearance of pressure on those who may be called upon to decide the case?
Compassion for a murdered journalist’s family is entirely understandable. It does not, however, remove the need for restraint when commenting on a case that will return before the courts. The distinction between expressing solidarity with a bereaved family and implying that an acquittal constitutes a denial of justice matters.
An uncomfortable contradiction also emerges. The Archbishop criticised networks of influence. Yet the ceremony itself brought ecclesiastical, political and judicial authority together, with senior officeholders occupying prominent places in the congregation. If such an occasion is used to express views that could bear on pending judicial proceedings, should we not also examine the Church’s own place within these networks?
To my mind, this exposes a hypocrisy within the Catholic Church in Malta: it condemns networks of influence while appearing unwilling to scrutinise its own access to public authority.
The contrast with a country such as France, with its strong tradition of secularism, is striking. Malta’s close ceremonial relationship between Church and state deserves scrutiny, particularly when it creates opportunities for religious authority to address matters that the judiciary may still have to determine.
The rule of law must apply consistently, including when a verdict is unpopular or conflicts with the expectations of influential institutions. It cannot be defended only when it produces the desired outcome.
Yet I hear no comparable concern from the European Union or the Venice Commission about this overlap between ecclesiastical influence and judicial independence. Their apparent silence raises a wider question about how consistently European institutions defend the principles they proclaim.
What troubles me in Malta reflects a broader European problem: the gap between professions of principle and their application when powerful institutions are involved. That gap weakens public trust and, ultimately, the credibility of the rule of law itself.